On the Gods and The World by Sallustius, Part I
Translation by Gilbert Murray in Five
Stages of Greek Religion
I.
What the disciple should be; and concerning Common Conceptions
Those who wish to hear about the Gods
should have been well guided from childhood, and not habituated to foolish
beliefs. They should also be in disposition good and sensible, that they may
properly attend to the teaching.
They ought also to know the common
conceptions. Common conceptions are those to which all men agree as soon as
they are asked; for instance, that all god [here and elsewhere, = godhood, divine
nature] is good, free from passion, free from change. For whatever suffers
change does so for the worse or the better; if for the worse, it is made bad;
if for the better, it must have been bad at first.
II.
That god is unchanging, unbegotten, eternal, incorporeal, and not in space.
Let the disciple be thus. Let the
teachings be of the following sort. The essences of the Gods never came into
existence (for that which always is never comes into existence; and that exists
for ever which possesses primary force and by nature suffers nothing): neither
do they consist of bodies; for even in bodies the powers are incorporeal.
Neither are they contained by space; for that is a property of bodies. Neither
are they separate from the first cause nor from one another, just as thoughts
are not separate from mind nor acts of knowledge from the soul.
III.
Concerning myths; that they are divine, and why.
We may well inquire, then, why the
ancients forsook these doctrines and made use of myths. There is this first benefit
from myths, that we have to search and do not have our minds idle.
That the myths are divine can be seen from
those who have used them. Myths have been used by inspired poets, by the best
of philosophers, by those who established the mysteries, and by the Gods
themselves in oracles. But why the myths are divine it is the duty of
philosophy to inquire. Since all existing things rejoice in that which is like
them and reject that which is unlike, the stories about the Gods ought to be
like the Gods, so that they may both be worthy of the divine essence and make
the Gods well disposed to those who speak of them: which could only be done by
means of myths.
Now the myths represent the Gods
themselves and the goodness of the Gods - subject always to the distinction of
the speakable and the unspeakable, the revealed and the unrevealed, that which
is clear and that which is hidden: since, just as the Gods have made the goods
of sense common to all, but those of intellect only to the wise, so the myths
state the existence of Gods to all, but who and what they are only to those who
can understand.
They also represent the activities of the
Gods. For one may call the world a myth, in which bodies and things are
visible, but souls and minds hidden. Besides, to wish to teach the whole truth
about the Gods to all produces contempt in the foolish, because they cannot
understand, and lack of zeal in the good, whereas to conceal the truth by myths
prevents the contempt of the foolish, and compels the good to practice philosophy.
But why have they put in the myths stories
of adultery, robbery, father-binding, and all the other absurdity? Is not that
perhaps a thing worthy of admiration, done so that by means of the visible
absurdity the soul may immediately feel that the words are veils and believe
the truth to be a mystery?
IV.
That the species of myth are five, with examples of each.
Of myths some are theological, some
physical, some psychic, and again some material, and some mixed from these last
two. The theological are those myths which use no bodily form but contemplate
the very essence of the Gods: e.g., Kronos swallowing his children. Since god
is intellectual, and all intellect returns into itself, this myth expresses in
allegory the essence of god.
Myths may be regarded physically when they
express the activities of the Gods in the world: e.g., people before now have
regarded Kronos as time, and calling the divisions of time his sons say that
the sons are swallowed by the father.
The psychic way is to regard the activities
of the soul itself; the soul's acts of thought, though they pass on to other
objects, nevertheless remain inside their begetters.
The material and last is that which the
Egyptians have mostly used, owing to their ignorance, believing material
objects actually to be Gods, and so calling them: e.g., they call the earth
Isis, moisture Osiris, heat Typhon, or again, water Kronos, the fruits of the
earth Adonis, and wine Dionysus.
To say that these objects are sacred to
the Gods, like various herbs and stones and animals, is possible to sensible
men, but to say that they are Gods is the notion of madmen - except, perhaps,
in the sense in which both the orb of the sun and the ray which comes from the
orb are colloquially called 'the sun'.
The mixed kind of myth may be seen in many
instances: for example they say that in a banquet of the Gods Discord threw
down a golden apple; the Goddesses contended for it, and were sent by Zeus to
Paris to be judged. Paris saw Aphrodite to be beautiful and gave her the apple.
Here the banquet signifies the hypercosmic powers of the Gods; that is why they
are all together. The golden apple is the world, which being formed out of
opposites, is naturally said to be 'thrown by Discord'. The different Gods
bestow different gifts upon the world, and are thus said to 'contend for the
apple'. And the soul which lives according to sense - for that is what Paris is
- not seeing the other powers in the world but only beauty, declares that the
apple belongs to Aphrodite.
Theological myths suit philosophers,
physical and psychic suit poets, mixed suit religious initiations, since every
initiation aims at uniting us with the world and the Gods.
To take another myth, they say that the
Mother of the Gods seeing Attis lying by the river Gallus fell in love with
him, took him, crowned him with her cap of stars, and thereafter kept him with
her. He fell in love with a nymph and left the Mother to live with her. For
this the Mother of the Gods made Attis go mad and cut off his genital organs
and leave them with the nymph, and then return and dwell with her.
Now the Mother of the Gods is the
principle that generates life; that is why she is called Mother. Attis is the
creator of all things which are born and die; that is why he is said to have
been found by the river Gallus. For Gallus signifies the Galaxy, or Milky Way,
the point at which body subject to passion begins. Now as the primary gods make
perfect the secondary, the Mother loves Attis and gives him celestial powers.
That is what the cap means. Attis loves a nymph: the nymphs preside over
generation, since all that is generated is fluid. But since the process of
generation must be stopped somewhere, and not allowed to generate something
worse than the worst, the creator who makes these things casts away his
generative powers into the creation and is joined to the Gods again. Now these
things never happened, but always are. And mind sees all things at once, but
reason (or speech) expresses some first and others after. Thus, as the myth is
in accord with the cosmos, we for that reason keep a festival imitating the
cosmos, for how could we attain higher order?
And at first we ourselves, having fallen
from heaven and living with the nymph, are in despondency, and abstain from
corn and all rich and unclean food, for both are hostile to the soul. Then
comes the cutting of the tree and the fast, as though we also were cutting off
the further process of generation. After that the feeding on milk, as though we
were being born again; after which come rejoicings and garlands and, as it
were, a return up to the Gods.
The season of the ritual is evidence to
the truth of these explanations. The rites are performed about the Vernal
equinox, when the fruits of the earth are ceasing to be produced, and day is
becoming longer than night, which applies well to spirits rising higher. (At
least, the other equinox is in mythology the time of the rape of Kore, which is
the descent of the souls.)
May these explanations of the myths find
favour in the eyes of the Gods themselves and the souls of those who wrote the
myths.
V.
On the First Cause
Next in order comes knowledge of the first
cause and the subsequent orders of the Gods, then the nature of the world, the
essence of intellect and of soul, then providence, fate, and fortune, then to
see virtue and formed from them, and from what possible source evil came into
the world.
Each of these subjects needs many long
discussions; but there is perhaps no harm in stating them briefly, so that a
disciple may not be completely ignorant about them.
It is proper to the first cause to be one
- for unity precedes multitude - and to surpass all things in power and
goodness. Consequently all things must partake of it. For owing to its power
nothing else can hinder it, and owing to its goodness it will not hold itself
apart.
If the first cause were soul, all things
would possess soul. If it were mind, all things would possess mind. If it were
being, all things would partake of being. And seeing this quality in all
things, some men have thought that it was being. Now if things simply were,
without being good, this argument would be true, but if things that are _are_
because of their goodness, and partake in the good, the first thing must needs
be both beyond-being and good. It is strong evidence of this that noble souls
despise being for the sake of the good, when they face death for their country
or friends or for the sake of virtue. - After this inexpressible country or
friends or for the sake of virtue. - After this inexpressible power come the
orders of the Gods.
VI.
On Gods Cosmic and Hypercosmic.
Of the Gods some are of the world, cosmic,
and some above the world, hypercosmic. By the cosmic I mean those who make the
cosmos. Of the hypercosmic Gods some create essence, some mind, and some soul.
Thus they have three orders; all of which may be found in treatises on the
subject.
Of the cosmic Gods some make the world be,
others animate it, others harmonize it, consisting as it does of different
elements; the fourth class keep it when harmonized.
These are four actions, each of which has
a beginning, middle, and end, consequently there must be twelve Gods governing
the world.
Those who make the world are Zeus,
Poseidon, and Hephaistos; those who animate it are Demeter, Hera, and Artemis;
those who harmonize it are Apollo, Aphrodite, and Hermes; those who watch over
it are Hestia, Athena, and Ares.
One can see secret suggestions of this in
their images. Apollo tunes a lyre; Athena is armed; Aphrodite is naked (because
harmony creates beauty, and beauty in things seen is not covered).
While these twelve in the primary sense
possess the world, we should consider that the other Gods are contained in
these. Dionysus in Zeus, for instance, Asklepios in Apollo, the Charites in
Aphrodite.
We can also discern their various spheres:
to Hestia belongs the earth, to Poseidon water, to Hera air, to Hephaistos
fire. And the six superior spheres to the Gods to whom they are usually attributed.
For Apollo and Artemis are to be taken for the Sun and Moon, the sphere of
Kronos should be attributed to Demeter, the ether to Athena, while the heaven
is common to all. Thus the orders, powers, and spheres of the twelve Gods have
been explained and celebrated in hymns.
VII.
On the Nature of the World and its Eternity.
The cosmos itself must of necessity be
indestructible and uncreated. Indestructible because, suppose it destroyed: the
only possibility is to make one better than this or worse or the same or a
chaos. If worse, the power which out of the better makes the worse must be bad.
If better, the maker who did not make the better at first must be imperfect in
power. If the same, there will be no use in making it; if a chaos... it is
impious even to hear such a thing suggested. These reasons would suffice to
show that the world is also uncreated: for if not destroyed, neither is it
created. Everything that is created is subject to destruction. And further,
since the cosmos exists by the goodness of god, if follows that god must always
be good and the world exist. Just as light coexists with the sun and with fire,
and shadow coexists with a body.
Of the bodies in the cosmos, some imitate
mind and move in orbits; some imitate soul and move in a straight line, fire
and air upward, earth and water downward. Of those that move in orbits the
fixed sphere goes from the east, the seven [planets] from the west (This is so
for various causes, especially lest the creation should be imperfect owing to
the rapid circuit of the spheres.)
The movement being different, the nature
of the bodies must also be different; hence the celestial body does not burn or
freeze what it touches, or do anything else that pertains to the four elements.
And since the Cosmos is a sphere - the
zodiac proves that - and in every sphere 'down' means 'toward the center', for
the center is furthest distant from every point, and heavy things fall 'down'
and fall to the earth.
All these things are made by the Gods,
ordered by mind, moved by soul. About the Gods we have spoken already.
VIII.
On Mind and Soul, and that the latter is immortal.
There is a certain force, less primary
than being but more primary than the soul, which draws its existence from being
and completes the soul as the sun completes the eyes. Of souls some are
rational and immortal, some irrational and mortal. The former are derived from
the first Gods, the latter from the secondary.
First, we must consider what soul is. It
is, then, that by which the animate differs from the inanimate. The difference
lies in motion, sensation, imagination, intelligence. Soul therefore, when
irrational, is the life of sense and imagination; when rational, it is the life
which controls sense and imagination and uses reason. The irrational soul
depends on the affections of the body; it feels desire and anger irrationally.
The rational soul both, with the help of reason, despises the body, and,
fighting against the irrational soul, produces either virtue or vice, according
as it is victorious or defeated.
It must be immortal, both because it knows
the Gods (and nothing mortal knows what is immortal), it looks down upon human
affairs as though it stood outside them, and like an unbodied thing, it is
affected in the opposite way to the body. For while the body is young and fine,
the soul blunders, but as the body grows old it attains its highest power.
Again, every good soul uses mind; but no body can produce mind: for how should
that which is without mind produce mind? Again, while the soul uses the body as
an instrument, it is not in it; just as the engineer is not in his engines
(although many engines move without being touched by any one). And if the soul
is often made to err by the body, that is not surprising. For the arts cannot
perform their work when their instruments are spoilt.
IX.
On Providence, Fate, and Fortune.
This is enough to show the Providence of
the Gods. For whence comes the ordering of the world, if there is no ordering
power? And whence comes the fact that all things are for a purpose: e.g.
irrational soul that there may be sensation, and rational that the earth may be
set in order?
But one can deduce the same result from
the evidences of providence in nature: e.g., the eyes have been made
transparent with a view to seeing; the nostrils are above the mouth to
distinguish bad-smelling foods; the front teeth are sharp to cut food, the back
teeth broad to grind it. And we find every part of every object arranged on a
similar principle. It is impossible that there should be so much providence in
the last details, and none in the first principles. Then the arts of prophecy
and of healing, which are part of the cosmos, come of the good providence of
the Gods.
All this care for the world, we must
believe, is taken by the Gods without any act of will or labor. As bodies which
possess some power produce their effects by merely existing: e.g. the sun gives
light and heat by merely existing; so, and far more so, the providence of the
Gods acts without effort to itself and for the good of the objects of its
forethought. This solves the problems of the Epicureans, who argue that what is
divine neither has trouble itself nor gives trouble to others.
The incorporeal providence of the Gods,
both for bodies and for souls, is of this sort; but that which is of bodies and
in bodies is different from this, and is called fate, Heimarmene, because the
chain of causes (Heirmos) is more visible in the case of bodies; and it is for
dealing with this fate that the science of Mathematic [=Astrology] has been
discovered.
Therefore, to believe that human things,
especially their material constitution, are ordered not only by celestial
beings but by the celestial bodies is a reasonable and true belief. Reason
shows that health and sickness, good fortune and bad fortune, arise according
to our deserts from that source. But to attribute men's acts of injustice and
lust to fate, is to make ourselves good and the Gods bad. Unless by chance a
man meant by such a statement that in general all things are for the good of
the world and for those who are in a natural state, but that bad education or
weakness of nature changes the goods of Fate for the worse. Just as it happens that
the Sun, which is good for all, may be injurious to persons with ophthalmia or
fever. Else why do the Massagetae eat their fathers, the Hebrews practice
circumcision, and the Persians preserve rules of rank? Why do astrologers,
while calling Saturn and Mars 'malignant' proceed to make them good,
attributing to them philosophy and royalty, generalships and treasures? And if
they are going to talk of triangles and squares, it is absurd that Gods should
change their natures according to their position in space, while human virtue
remains the same everywhere. Also the fact that the stars predict high or low
rank for the father of the person whose horoscope is taken, teaches that they
do not always make things happen but sometimes only indicate things. For how
could things which preceded the birth depend upon the birth?
Further, as there is providence and fate
concerned with nations and cities, and also concerned with each individual, so
there is also fortune, which should next be treated. That power of the Gods
which orders for the good things which are not uniform, and which happen
contrary to expectation, is commonly called Fortune, and it is for this reason
that the Goddess is especially worshipped in public by cities; for every city
consists of elements which are not uniform. Fortune has power beneath the moon,
since above the moon no single thing can happen by fortune.
If fortune makes a wicked man prosperous
and a good man poor, there is no need to wonder. For the wicked regard wealth
as everything, the good as nothing. And the good fortune of the bad cannot take
away their badness, while virtue alone will be enough for the good.
X.
Concerning Virtue and Vice.
The doctrine of virtue and vice depends on
that of the soul. When the irrational soul enters into the body and immediately
produces fight and desire, the rational soul, put in authority over all these,
makes the soul tripartite, composed of reason, fight, and desire. Virtue in the
region of reason is wisdom, in the region of fight is courage, in the region of
desire is temperance; the virtue of the whole soul is righteousness. It is for
reason to judge what is right, for fight in obedience to reason to despise
things that appear terrible, for desire to pursue not the apparently desirable,
but, that which is with reason desirable. When these things are so, we have a
righteous life; for righteousness in matters of property is but a small part of
virtue. And thus we shall find all four virtues in properly trained men, but
among the untrained one may be brave and unjust, another temperate and stupid,
another prudent and unprincipled. Indeed, these qualities should not be called
virtues when they are devoid of reason and imperfect and found in irrational
beings. Vice should be regarded as consisting of the opposite elements. In
reason it is folly, in fight, cowardice, in desire, intemperance, in the whole
soul, unrighteousness.
The virtues are produced by the right
social organization and by good rearing and education, the vices by the
opposite.
XI.
Concerning right and wrong Social Organization.
Constitutions also depend on the
tripartite nature of the soul. The rulers are analogous to reason, the soldiers
to fight, the common folk to desires.
Where all things are done according to
reason and the best man in the nation rules, it is a kingdom; where more than
one rule according to reason and fight, it is an aristocracy; where the
government is according to desire and offices depend on money, that
constitution is called a timocracy. The contraries are: to kingdom, tyranny,
for kingdom does all things with the guidance of reason and tyranny nothing; to
aristocracy, oligarchy, when not the best people but a few of the worst are
rulers; to timocracy, democracy, when not the rich but the common folk possess
the whole power.
XII.
The origin of evil things; and that there is no positive evil.
The Gods being good and making all things,
how do evils exist in the world? Or perhaps it is better first to state the
fact that, the Gods being good and making all things, there is no positive
evil, it only comes by absence of good; just as darkness itself does not exist,
but only comes about by absence of light.
If evil exists it must exist either in
Gods or minds or souls or bodies. It does not exist in any God, for all god is
good. If anyone speaks of a 'bad mind' he means a mind without mind. If of a
bad soul, he will make the soul inferior to body, for no body in itself is
evil. If he says that evil is made up of soul and body together, it is absurd
that separately they should not be evil, but joined should create evil.
Suppose it is said that there are evil
spirits: - if they have their power from the Gods, they cannot be evil; if from
elsewhere, the Gods do not make all things. If they do not make all things,
then either they wish to or cannot, or they can and do not wish; neither of
which is consistent with the idea of god. We may see, therefore, from these
arguments, that there is no positive evil in the world.
It is in the activities of men that the
evils appear, and that not of all men nor always. And as to these, if men
sinned for the sake of evil, nature itself would be evil. But if the adulterer
thinks his adultery bad but his pleasure good, and the murderer thinks the
murder bad but the money he gets by it good, and the man who does evil to an
enemy thinks that to do evil is bad but to punish his enemy good, and if the
soul commits all its sins in that way, then the evils are done for the sake of
goodness. (In the same way, because in a given place light does not exist, there
comes darkness, which has no positive existence.) The soul sins therefore
because, while aiming at good, it makes mistakes about the good, because it is
not primary essence. And we see many things done by the Gods to prevent it from
making mistakes and to heal it when it has made them. Arts and sciences, curses
and prayers, sacrifices and initiations, laws and constitutions, judgments and
punishments, all came into existence for the sake of preventing souls from
sinning; and when they are gone forth from the body, Gods and spirits of
purification cleanse them of their sins.
XIII.
How things eternal are said to be made.
Concerning the Gods and the world and
human things this account will suffice for those who are not able to go through
the whole course of philosophy but yet have not souls beyond help.
It remains to explain how these objects
were never made and are never separated one from another, since we ourselves
have said above that the secondary substances were 'made' by the first.
Everything made is made either by art or
by a physical process or according to some power. Now in art or nature the
maker must needs be prior to the made: but the maker, according to power,
constitutes the made absolutely together with itself, since its power is
inseparable from it; as the sun makes light, fire makes heat, snow makes cold.
Now if the Gods make the world by art,
they do not make it be, they make it be such as it is. For all art makes the
form of the object. What therefore makes it to be?
If by a physical process, how in that case
can the maker help giving pat of himself to the made? As the Gods are
incorporeal, the world ought to be incorporeal too. If it were argued that the
Gods were bodies, then where would the power of incorporeal things come from?
And if we were to admit it, it would follow that when the world decays, its
maker must be decaying too, if he is a maker by physical process.
If the Gods make the world neither by art
nor by physical process, it only remains that they make it by power. Everything
so made subsists together with that which possesses the power. Neither can
things so made be destroyed, except the power of the maker be taken away: so
that those who believe in the destruction of the world, either deny the
existence of the Gods, or, while admitting it, deny God's power.
Therefore he who makes all things by his
own power makes all things subsist together with himself. And since his power
is the greatest power he must needs be the maker not only of men and animals,
but of Gods, men, and spirits. And the further removed the first God is from
our nature, the more powers there must be between us and him. For all things
that are very far apart have many intermediate points between them.
XIV.
In what sense, though the Gods never change, they are said to be made angry and
appeased.
If any one thinks the doctrine of the
unchangeableness of the Gods is reasonable and true, and then wonders how it is
that they rejoice in the good and reject the bad, are angry with sinners and
become propitious when appeased, the answer is as follows: god does not rejoice
- for that which rejoices also grieves; nor is he angered - for to be angered
is a passion; nor is he appeased by gifts - if he were, he would be conquered
by pleasure.
It is impious to suppose that the divine
is affected for good or ill by human things. The Gods are always good and
always do good and never harm, being always in the same state and like
themselves. The truth simply is that, when we are good, we are joined to the
Gods by our likeness to live according to virtue we cling to the Gods, and when
we become evil we make the Gods our enemies - not because they are angered
against us, but because our sins prevent the light of the Gods from shining
upon us, and put us in communion with spirits of punishment. And if by prayers
and sacrifices we find forgiveness of sins, we do not appease or change the
Gods, but by what we do and by our turning toward the divine we heal our own
badness and so enjoy again the goodness of the Gods. To say that god turns away
from the evil is like saying that the sun hides himself from the blind.
XV.
Why we give worship to the Gods when they need nothing.
This solves the question about sacrifices
and other rites performed to the Gods. The divine itself is without needs, and
the worship is paid for our own benefit. The providence of the Gods reaches
everywhere and needs only some congruity for its reception. All congruity comes
about by representation and likeness; for which reason the temples are made in
representation of heaven, the altar of earth, the images of life (that is why
they are made like living things), the prayers of the element of though, the
mystic letters of the unspeakable celestial forces, the herbs and stones of
matter, and the sacrificial animals of the irrational life in us.
From all these things the Gods gain
nothing; what gain could there be to God? It is we who gain some communion with
them.
On the Gods and The World by Sallustius,
Part II
Translation by Gilbert Murray in Five
Stages of Greek Religion
XVI.
Concerning sacrifices and other worships, that we benefit man by them, but not
the Gods.
I think it well to add some remarks about sacrifices. In the first
place, since we have received everything from the Gods, and it is right to pay
the giver some tithe of his gifts, we pay such a tithe of possessions in votive
offering, of bodies in gifts of (hair and) adornment, and of life in
sacrifices. Then secondly, prayers without sacrifices are only words, with
sacrifices they are live words; the word gives meaning to the life, while the
life animates the word. Thirdly, the happiness of every object is its own
perfection; and perfection for each is communion with its own cause. For this
reason we pray for communion with the Gods. Since, therefore, the first life is
the life of the Gods, but human life is also life of a kind, and human life
wishes for communion with divine life, a mean term is needed. For things very
far apart cannot have communion without a mean term, and the mean term must be
like the things joined; therefore the mean term between life and life must be
life. That is why men sacrifice animals; only the rich do so now, but in old
days everybody did, and that not indiscriminately, but giving the suitable
offerings to each god together with a great deal of other worship. Enough of
this subject.
XVII.
That the World is by nature Eternal.
We have shown above that the Gods will not destroy the world. It remains
to show that its nature is indestructible.
Everything that is destroyed is either destroyed by itself or by
something else. If the world is destroyed by itself, fire must needs burn of
itself and water dry itself. If by something else, it must be either by a body
or by something incorporeal. By something incorporeal is impossible; for
incorporeal things preserve bodies - nature, for instance, and soul - and
nothing is destroyed by a cause whose nature is to preserve it. If it is
destroyed by some body, it must be either by those which exist or by others.
If by those which exist: then either those moving in a straight line
must be destroyed by those that revolve, or vice versa. But those that revolve
have no destructive nature; else, why do we never see anything destroyed from
that cause? Nor yet can those which are moving straight touch the others; else,
why have they never been able to do so yet?
But neither can those moving straight be destroyed by one another: for
the destruction of one is the creation of another; and that is not to be
destroyed but to change.
But if the world is to be destroyed by other bodies than these it is
impossible to say where such bodies are or whence they are to arise.
Again, everything destroyed is destroyed either in form or matter. (Form
is the shape of a thing, matter is the body.) Now if the form is destroyed and
the matter remains, we see other things come into being. If matter is
destroyed, how is it that the supply has not failed in all these years?
If when matter is destroyed other matter takes its place, the new matter
must come either from something that is or from something that is not. If from
that-which-is, as long as that-which-is always remains, matter always remains.
But if that-which-is is destroyed, such a theory means that not the world only
but everything in the universe is destroyed.
If again matter comes from that-which-is-not: in the first place, it is
impossible for anything to come from that which is not; but suppose it to
happen, and that matter did arise from that which is not; then, as long as
there are things which are not, matter will exist. For I presume there can
never be an end of things which are not.
If they say that matter formless:
in the first place, why does this happen to the world as a whole when it does
not happen to any part? Secondly, by this hypothesis they do not destroy the
being of bodies but only their beauty.
Further, everything destroyed is either resolved into the elements from
which it came, or else vanishes into not-being. If things are resolved into the
elements from which they came, then there will be others: else how did they
come into being at all? If that-which-is is to depart into not-being, what
prevents that happening to god himself? (Which is absurd.) Or if god's power
prevents that, it is not a mark of power to be able to save nothing but
oneself. And it is equally impossible for that-which-is to come out of nothing
and to depart into nothing.
Again, if the world is destroyed, it must needs either be destroyed
according to nature or against nature. Against nature is impossible, for that
which is against nature is not stronger than nature. If according to nature,
there must be another nature which changes the nature of the world: which does
not appear.
Again, anything that is naturally destructible we can ourselves destroy.
But no one has ever destroyed or altered the round body of the world. And the
elements, though they can be changed, cannot be destroyed. Again, everything
destructible is changed by time and grows old. But the world through all these
years has remained utterly unchanged.
Having said so much for the help of those who feel the need of very
strong demonstration, I pray the world himself to be gracious to me.
XVIII.
Why there are rejections of god, and that god is not injured.
Nor need the fact that rejections of god have taken place in certain
parts of the earth and will often take place hereafter, disturb the mind of the
wise: both because these things do not affect the Gods, just as we saw that
worship did not benefit them; and because the soul, being of middle essence,
cannot be always right; and because the whole world cannot enjoy the providence
of the Gods equally, but some parts may partake of it eternally, some at
certain times, some in the primal manner, some in the secondary. Just as the
head enjoys all the senses, but the rest of the body only one.
For this reason, it seems, those who ordained festivals ordained also
forbidden days, in which some temples lay idle, some were shut, some had their
adornments removed, in expiation of the weakness of our nature.
It is not unlikely, too, that the rejection of god is a kind of
punishment: we may well believe that those who knew the Gods and neglected them
in one life may in another life be deprived of the knowledge of them
altogether. Also those who have worshipped their own kings as gods have
deserved as their punishment to lose all knowledge of god.
XIX.
Why sinners are not punished at once.
There is no need to be surprised if neither these sins nor yet others
bring immediate punishment upon sinners. For it is not only spirits who punish
the evil, the soul brings itself to judgment: and also it is not right for
those who endure for ever to attain everything in a short time: and also, there
is need of human virtue. If punishment followed instantly upon sin, men would
act justly from fear and have no virtue.
Souls are punished when they have gone forth from the body, some
wandering among us, some going to hot or cold places of the earth, some
harassed by spirits. Under all circumstances they suffer with the irrational part
of their nature, with which they also sinned. For its sake there subsists that
shadowy body which is seen about graves, especially the graves of evil livers.
XX.
On Transmigration of Souls, and how Souls are said to migrate into brute
beasts.
If the transmigration of a soul takes place into a rational being, it
simply becomes the soul of that body. But if the soul migrates into a brute
beast, it follows the body outside, as a guardian spirit follows a man. For
there could never be a rational soul in an irrational being.
The transmigration of souls can be proved from the congenital
afflictions of persons. For why are some born blind, others paralytic, others
with some sickness in the soul itself? Again, it is the natural duty of souls
to do their work in the body; are we to suppose that when once they leave the
body they spend all eternity in idleness? Again, if the souls did not again
enter into bodies, they must either be infinite in number or god must
constantly be making new ones. But there is nothing infinite in the world; for
in a finite whole there cannot be an infinite part. Neither can others be made;
for everything in which something new goes on being created, must be imperfect.
And the world, being made by a perfect author, ought naturally to be perfect.
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